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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
and insignia are painted on the side windows of a friend's
pleasure vehicle, a custom which is becoming increasingly
popular-will our courts arbitrarily denominate such
vehicles "commercial" ones and penalize the shrewd mer-
chants who seek advertisement by such methods? Suppose
an indulgent employer has permitted his employees to use
his truck to convey their families to a picnic on a Sunday,
or to conduct a night "straw-ride"-will our judges search
for a trade name on the panels of the truck and raise the
presumption of ownership and use in the employer's busi-
ness as an inexorable rule of law? If they do, employers
will undoubtedly curb their generosity when they discover
that their altruism is a costly virtue.
Gilbert Nurick
MISREPRESENTATION OF INTENTION TO PAY
-Commerce and efficient business methods have always
necessitated the giving of credit. Ordinarily where the
debtor has failed to fulfill his promise to pay at the date
stipulated, the creditor's action is in contract.1 Too often
it appears that the debtor is insolvent or had the precon-
ceived intention not to pay for the goods received or both.
In such a case an action of trespass in trover or replevin is
the most efficient action since the recovery is a judgment
for the full value of the goods or the restoration thereof.
In dealing with this subject we must distinguish false
representations from concealment of an intention not to
pay. False representations justifying the recission of a
contract of sale and a concealment of an intention not to
pay are separate and distinct wrongs. The first is complete
without an intention not to pay and no such intention need
be shown, while the second is complete without false repre-
sentations other than such as are implied from the pur-
chase or may expressly be made directly concerning the in-
tention. Both may be present in a given case,-but each is
complete without the other.2
Generally in the United States it is found that one who
purchases goods with a preconceived intention not to pay,
is guilty of fraud.3 One of the earliest Pennsylvania cases'
'12 R. C. L. 266 and cases therein cited. See Williston on Sales
p. 1071. The purchase of goods implies a representation that the buyer
intends to pay for them.
212 R. C. L. 266.
812 R. C. L. 263; 35 Cyc. 80.
,'McKinley v. McGregor, 3 Whart. (Pa.) 369 (1838).
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on this subject is strictly in accord with this general rule,
holding that where a person purchased goods with a pre-
conceived design of not paying therefor, it is a fraud, the
property not passing to the purchaser; and that replevin or
trover would lie by the seller against the purchaser, but not
against an innocent purchaser for value without notice.
A year later this decision was followed by the court in
Knowles v. Lord5 in which it appeared that the defendants
had bought six cases of goods "without intention to pay for
them".
The most celebrated case on this subject is Smith v.
Smith, Murphy and Co.6 which completely changed the pre-
vious doctrine of the Pennsylvania courts. In that case one
Snodgrass bought goods of the plaintiffs, Smith, Murphy
and Co. costing $676.22. It appeared that at the time the
purchase was made Snodgrass knowingly was insolvent and
unable to pay for the goods and concealed his inability to
pay from the plaintiffs. The lower court charged that this
would render the contract fraudulent and void, and that the
plaintiffs might rescind it and recover the goods or their
value. The mere fact that the purchaser was at the time
insolvent, and did not know of his insolvency, would not
render the contract void, but the purchase must have been
made "with a design not to pay for the goods".
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the lower
court and said, per Lowrie, J. "Our own case of McKinley
v. McGregor, 3 Whart. 370, would seem to be more import-
ant; but its influence for this case may be overestimated
if we do not read it with reference to the extraordinary
character of the cause, and to the fact that this question
was not raised in the bill of exceptions. No question was
raised on the charge of the court or the sufficiency of the
evidence for the case was submitted without a charge".
This court then proceeded to lay down the doctrine
which has been followed and is the law of Pennsylvania
today, much, perhaps, to the distaste and dissatisfaction of
later judges. The rule, as stated therein, is that there
must have been actual artifice, intended and fitted to deceive,
before a man can claim that he has been defrauded.
The reasons for this doctrine seem to be that in the
opinion of the judges sitting, "an intention not to pay is
dishonest, but it is not fraudulent: 9 Watts 34; 6 Wend. 81.
The law provides an action on the contract for just such
dishonesty. It is no more fraudulent to have such an in.
54 Whart. (Pa.) 500 (1839).
621 Pa. 367, 60 Am. D. 51 (1852).
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tention at the time of the purchase than at the time when
payment ought to be made. Such intention by itself is
disregarded by the law for it can be set aside by the usual
contract remedies".
The whole theory upon which the decision is based is
the fact that the act of purchase is not an element in the
fraudulent conduct but rather the object and consequence
of it, and hence that there is merely a fraudulent intent,
not accompanied by an overt act, which does not constitute
actionable fraud.7
Connecticut' is the only other state, to the writer's
knowledge, which follows the doctrine laid down in the
above case.
Naturally the question of misrepresentation of inten-
tion arises most frequently in cases where the defendant
was insolvent at the time when he purchased the goods and
failed to reveal his insolvency. Backentoss v. Speichere was
such a case. Here the court relied entirely on the leading
case of Smith v. Smith, supra, declaring per Woodward, J. in
a discussion of the right to reclamation where the condition
of a conditional sale had not been compiled with: "Where
there is a sale of goods and delivery of possession, even
though the buyer intends, at the time, not to pay for them,
and conceals his insolvency from the seller, it is not a cheat
that will avoid the sale. There must be artifice practiced
such as was intended and fitted to deceive, to constitute
a cheat". The court then goes on to state that the New
York courts have a different doctrine than that of Penn-
sylvania, in that, there, an intention on the part of the
purchaser not to pay the goods prevents title from passing
out of the seller.
Illustrating the character of trick or artifice necessary
to vitiate the contract of sale, in a later case 10 a creditor
employed an agent to buy a horse of his debtor, as if for
the agent himself. He gave the agent ten dollars to pay
on the account and instructed him to promise to pay the
balance in a few days. By an understanding between the
agent and the principal, he. the agent, was to pay by hand-
ing over the claim of the creditor-but -nothing was to be
said of the claim when buying the horse. This was done
by the agent and when he handed over the claim, the debtor
refused it and sued the creditor in replevin. Recovery was
?As to the necessity of overt acts, see 12 R. C. L. 241 Sec. 11.
844 L. R. A. (N. S.) 28.
'31 Pa. 324 (1855).
1OHarner v. Fisher, 58 Pa. 453 (1868).
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allowed.
Where goods were sold to an insolvent purchaser who
had failed to reveal his financial embarrassment, it was
held1' that the mere insolvency of a purchaser of goods and
his knowledge of it are not alone such' fraud as will set
aside a sale and enable the seller to rescind the contract
and replevy the goods after they had come fairly and fully
into the possession of the purchaser. Repeating the words
of the court, "The law of this state is not that insolvency
and the mere knowledge of it are such a fraud as to set
a-ide the sale and enable the seller to rescind, and to re-
plevy the goods after they have come fully and fairly into
the possession of the purchaser. It requires artifice, trick
or false pretence, as a means of obtaining possession to
avoid the purchase. * * * * * Insolvency and a knowledge of
it at the time of the sale are evidence to go to the jury
with other facts to show the intended fraud, but standing
alone will not operate to rescind after a possession fully
and fairly acquired. There must be bad faith-an intent at
the time to defraud the seller".
Glancing at the essential elements required to sustain
an action for deceit, namely: 1. A representation made as
a statement of fact. 2. Untrue. 3. Known to be untrue by
the maker (scienter) or else recklessly made. 4. Made
with intent to deceive. 5. Other relied upon the statement.
6. Was deceived. 7. Injury or damage, 2 we find therein
that the intent of the purchaser is an important factor in
deciding the insolvency cases. A case1 3 discussing this
problem occurred in 1893. Here one of the purchasers of
some goods of the plaintiffs expressly stated at the time
of the purchase that he was solvent. He was really insolv-
ent. The court held that this false statement was not trick
or artifice sufficient to warrant a finding for the plaintiff
since the defendant had stated what he thought was his
financial condition in good faith, basing his statement on
reasonable expectations 'that he would make a profit on
the logwood he was buying.
Although Smith v. Smith, Murphy and Co., supra, is
still followed by present cases, it is done so with the dis-
satisfaction of some of the judges-to such a degree that
the Supreme Court will not extend this rule a step beyond
what the authorities require. In Bughman, Trustee v. Cent-
"'Rodman v. Thalheimer, 75 Pa. 23? (1874).
1212 R. C. L. 240.
13Wessels v, Weiss Bros., 156 Pa. 591 (1893).
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ral Bank,1 the court, per Mitchell, J., agreed that McKinley
v. McGregor, supra, expressed the sounder doctrine and de-
clared that the departure made by Smith v. Smith, supra, is
"much to be regretted. * * * * It was not made by an unani-
mous court, nor has it ever received the unmixed approba-
tion of the bench or the bar". However, in this case, regard-
less of the disapproval of the rule, the court deemed it wise
not to unsettle the law regarding the subject as laid down
by the Smith Case forty years earlier. They seemed to take
some little satisfaction in declaring that "any additional
circumstance which tends to show trick, artifice, false rep-
resentation, or in the language of Smith v. Smith, supra;
conduct which reasonably involves a false representation
will be sufficient to take the case out of the rules of these
authorities".
By the absolute convictions of this court that the New
York rule"5 agreeing with McKinley v. McGregor, supra, is
the sounder, we can conclude that any act involving the
slightest taint of artifice will be taken as sufficient trick or
artifice to take the case out of the rule in Pennsylvania.1
In still another case17 two years after the above, the
purchase of a large number of beer kegs was made by the
defendant from the plaintiffs, after the defendant, on being
questioned as to his financial responsibility, replied, "I am
in better condition than ever I was". In reality he was in-
solvent at the time. Here it was held that the defendant
and his knowledge of it when he made the purchase were
not alone sufficient to invalidate the sale or support an
action by the seller in rescission of it. They "are mere
evidence to go to the jury with other facts to show the
intended fraud".' However the insolvency of the defend-
ant and his knowledge of it, coupled with a representation
of solvency which induced the plaintiffs to part with the
possession of the goods was sufficient trick or artifice to
enable the latter to recover possession of it by a suit in
rescission of the sale.
A few words may be added concerning lack of reason-
able expectation of ability to pay. There is a conflict of
authority as to whether the fact that a purchaser of goods
159 Pa. 94, (1893).
15Van Neste v. Conover, 20 Barb., (N. Y.) 547.
16Read dicta in Allen v. Sarshik, 299 Pa. 261, (1930) inferring that
the rule of Smith v. Smith, 21 Pa. 367, is followed only on ground of
stare decisis.
"TCincinnati Cooperage Co. v. Gaul, 170 Pa. 545 (1895).
'8Rodman v. Thalheimer, 75 Pa. 232 (1874).
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has no reasonable expectation of being able to pay for
them is equivalent to an intention on his part not to pay
for them; some courts holding it is equivalent to such an
intention, and others directly to the contrary.19
The Maryland rule that in an action of replevin, insolv-
ency and lack of reasonable expectation of paying for the
goods were sufficient to invalidate the sale on the ground
of fraud2" was recognized in two Pennsylvania cases which
passed upon Maryland contracts.21
However, under the Pennsylvania rule, since the gist
of the offense is the overt act, neither the intent not to pay
nor lack of reasonable expectation of paying would be
sufficient.
22
In summarizing it may be said that the present Penn-
sylvania rule is that the mere misrepresentation of intention
to pay is not actionable without proof of trick or artifice
intended and fitting to deceive.28 Most of the states agree
that the mere failure of a purchaser to disclose his insolv-
ency is not fraudulent " in absence of intention not to pay
for the goods; but the circumstances may show that con-
cealment of insolvency by a purchaser of goods was fraud-
ulent evincing an intention not to pay for them.25 How-
ever, this is contra in Pennsylvania."
Massachusetts is the only state, to the writer's know-
ledge, which has passed a statute making a preconceived
intention not to pay, fraudulent.2 1 In that state a purchase
of goods without intention to pay for them is punished
criminally by imprisonment.28
Herbert Horn
1944 L. R. A. (N. S.) 11 et seq.; 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 556 et seq.
ZPowell v. Bradlee, 9 GilL and J. (Md.) 220.
21Mann v. Salsberg, 17 Pa. Super. Ct. 280 (1901); Perlman v.
Sartorius, 162 Pa. 320 (1894).
2Z6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 560 notes.
23Smith v. Smith, 21 Pa. 367; 60 Am. D. 51 (1852).
21Williston on Sales p. 1072.
2514 L. R. A. 265 notes.
2 aSmith v. Smith, 21 Pa. 367, 60 Am. D. 51 (1852); Rodman v.
Thalheimer, 75 Pa. 232 (1874); Backentoss v. Speicher, 31 Pa. 324
(1855), holding there must be trick or artifice practiced.
2?Dow v. Sanborn, 3 Allen (Mass.) 181 (1861).
28Gen. Stat. c. 124, secs, 5, 34; Rev. Stat. c. 98, secs. 31, 36.
